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According to many authors, so-called “central planning” had disappeared from European countries 
by 1989. However, this is by no means certain. Many former centrally planned economies still en-
gage in central planning, in both the private and public sectors. Moreover, there is a striking similar-
ity between so-called “strategic planning” in large private and public units and central planning in 
a small-sized economy. These similarities and differences are examined in this article using several 
examples, concluding with city planning. The analysis suggests that city politicians may find useful 
lessons in organization studies, revealing that while planning has a powerful comforting and tran-
quilizing function, plans, like tools, need to be abandoned when they are obsolete or cumbersome. 
Additionally, planners and managers may find it useful to admit that the differences between the 
private and public sectors are not as large as conventionally assumed and that their activities are 
always connected to politics.
The geographical location of central 
planning
The title of this section may appear at first blush to be a joke. 
Is it not the case that everyone knows that central planning 
was restricted to totalitarian regimes – most recently to 
pseudo-socialist and communist regimes such as the late 
Soviet Union and its allies? However, is it really so? 
Planning in a centrally planned economy
Between 1972 and 1975 and again between 1978 and 
1980, I participated in a large research project in Poland 
run by a joint team of economists and psychologists. The 
study included fieldwork: in three head offices of domes-
tic trade in Poland and 49 enterprises (corresponding to 
the administrative structure of 49 voivodships) subordi-
nated to one of them (Beksiak & Czarniawska, 1977). 
Unlike speculative studies based on traditional economic 
models, this study aimed to describe the actual function-
ing of a part of a centrally planned economy.
The  traditional  depiction  of  a  socialist  economy 
defines  management  system  as  a  set  of  principles 
and tools applied by central economic authorities to 
evoke particular decisions and actions on the part of 
economic units, as required by a central plan formu-
lated by these authorities. In practice, however, just as 
there is no perfect competitive market, there was no 
perfectly centrally planned economy. A scrutiny of the 
translation of plans into management and then opera-
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tions revealed one undeniable result: nothing went as 
planned. Actual management processes, which were 
the focus of our attention, were not confined to what 
was described as a formal system. There were many 
informal ways of influencing the actual performance 
of enterprises, and even the formal economic instru-
ments often changed their direction when applied in 
practice. This is not to say, as did many outsiders who 
attempted  to  decipher  the  complexities  of  socialist 
economies, that there were two systems, one formal 
and one informal, yielding one formal plan and one 
informal plan. They were intertwined in a great many 
unpredictable ways, making a researcher’s task rela-
tively complex. In what follows, I report some results 
from a study that we conducted in 1978, interviewing 
representatives of Head Offices of Trade (HO-Ts) and 
General Managers (GMs) from the enterprises subor-
dinated to those (55 persons altogether).
One reason for the complexity – of the researcher’s 
and GMs’ work – was that the central plan had already 
been  independently  translated  into  local  realities  in 
two places before the enterprises or their GMs received 
it. One place of translation was obviously the HO-Ts 
(each situated in a large city) and the others were lo-
cal authorities. The local authorities consisted of local 
administrative authorities, local political authorities, 
and local unions or self-management bodies. One may 
suspect that even those three units translated the plan 
differently, but because of the ruling role of the Pol-
ish United Workers’ Party (PUWP), their translations 
were usually aligned to each other by the local party 
committee. This was usually the case, but not always: 
some of the GMs I interviewed mentioned up to seven 
different translations versions of the central plan being 
received by the enterprise (Czarniawska, 1985).
Not  surprisingly,  these  translations  from  central 
plans into expectations about local plans were incon-
sistent more often than not – even if they came from 
the same source. One result was that, given the numer-
ous individuals charged with the enterprises’ fulfilling 
the plan, unexpected areas of autonomy arose. This 
mixture  of  control  and  autonomy  produced  conse-
quences that can be summarized as follows:
1.  Decision-making processes were extended over 
time in the hope that inconsistent expectations 
would be reconciled. One HO-T issued a direc-
tive that enterprises were to observe strict spe-
cialization in their stores. Soon thereafter, a sur-
plus of rubber boots was discovered in many 
warehouses. A new directive was immediately 
sent to all the GMs ordering an extension of rub-
ber boot sales to all stores – grocery stores in-
cluded. The GMs decided to wait and see, and in 
two weeks, that directive had been revoked.
2.  There was a general feeling of powerlessness 
because GMs could not act upwards, even in the 
most absurd situations. One of the companies 
dared to report near the end of the year that 
its planned objectives would not be achieved. 
The CT reacted with a punishment designed for 
such cases: the employees had to start working 
on Saturdays. The problem was that on Satur-
days, the stores were closed, no sales were pos-
sible, and even delivery workers had Saturdays 
off. Additionally, plans could not be fulfilled be-
cause of supply shortages. Employees rebelled, 
but the GMs advised them to go through their 
local unions and party committees; the manag-
ers could do nothing, as they  were also expect-
ed to work on Saturdays.
3.  Consequently, the GMs, convinced that the safest 
decisions were the best, tended to avoid risks, 
no  matter  how  great  the  potential  economic 
gains. An experiment changing regulations on 
the responsibility for waste and deficits result-
ed in substantially increased sales and some-
what increased deficits, which was treated by 
the GMs as proof that the innovation had failed. 
4.  Faced  with  conflicting  expectations,  GMs  made 
choices that could be harmful to the enterprise or 
its clients but that protected the GMs from punish-
ment. When in doubt, they followed the rules.
5.  A prolonged experience of role conflict produced 
negative psychological effects, yet only three in-
dividuals admitted to experiencing negative psy-
chosomatic symptoms during the annual check-
up ordered by the Ministry of Trade’s Personnel 
Department. The GMs told me that they lied to 
avoid  there  being  a  record  in  their  personnel 
files that could be used against them in “troubled 
times” (Czarniawska, 1985, pp. 69-71).
Plans and their effects meet powerfully once more – at 
the time of reporting. In the view of HO-Ts, the reports 
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sequently exaggerated their needs) and overstated their 
achievements. HO-T representatives considered these 
inaccuracies to be the GMs’ “insurance policy” – a way 
of minimizing their failures in advance.
The GMs agreed that the reports were inaccurate, but 
they explained it differently. Their demands were ex-
aggerated because they were never met (a well-known 
bureaucratic vicious circle); and the GMs’ achievements 
may have been overstated because of the irrational com-
petition for information among various authorities. The 
GMs wanted to report on the 5th of each month, but the 
HO-Ts wanted the report by the 30th of the previous 
month because it would make it easier to react should 
anything go wrong. Thus, the end-of-the-month figures 
were  estimated  using  the  sales  forecast  (notoriously 
wrong, as wages and salaries were paid at the end of 
the month). However, the local administrative authori-
ties wanted the information even earlier – by the 27th 
– and local political authorities had to be first, so they 
demanded a report by the 25th. All of this was happen-
ing, incidentally, prior to the use of computers for this 
purpose. The situation generated a boomerang effect; 
because the performance of an enterprise was exagger-
ated in forecast-based reports, expectations for the next 
period  were  set  unrealistically,  and  the  gap  between 
plans and performances grew over time. One of the 
more ingenious solutions to this problem was to throw 
the boomerang at the consumer. A continuous shortage 
of toilet paper made one of the HO-Ts estimate a high 
demand for this product, and the producer felt com-
pelled to import a new product line. The demand was 
met in full, but consumers bought incredible quantities 
of the paper and stored it at home. When the supply be-
came continuous, consumers had no need to buy more, 
and stores and warehouses held substantial quantities of 
toilet paper. Another solution was called for: although 
toilet paper could have been in continuous supply, it 
was delivered irregularly, so that consumers returned to 
their hoarding habits. 
I  was  given  an  opportunity,  however,  to  observe 
central plans that worked well – in US retail corpora-
tions that I deemed to be roughly equivalent to the or-
ganisations that I studied in Poland. 
Planning in a market economy
Between 1980 and 1981, I interviewed 40 representa-
tives of corporate headquarters (CHQs) and CEOs or 
their equivalents in divisions located in Massachusetts 
(Czarniawska, 1985). Many of these corporations were 
the same size as the Polish Head Offices of Trade, and 
they could have 49 or more subsidiaries.
To put it briefly: there were central plans in US cor-
porations, but this central planning looked different. 
In the corporations that I described under the la-
bel of Autonomy (Czarniawska, 1985), the CEOs set 
their own objectives based on information collected 
from both above (the general preferences, trends, and 
directions of expansion favored by their CHQs) and 
below (the aspirations and resources of subordinates 
in their own division). These plans were subsequently 
submitted for evaluation at the CHQs, and when dis-
agreements arose, intensive negotiations began that 
did not always reach consensus. Ultimately, the CHQ 
usually allowed the CEOs to make their own decisions 
but then controlled their actions “very, very tightly”. In 
general, the CEOs believed that the main concern of 
the CHQs was to create conditions that facilitated the 
achievement of objectives, and their primary respon-
sibility was to advise and guide. The final outcomes 
were one- and five-year plans for the entire corpora-
tion. What did the CEOs think of this system?
“It’s a strength because you have a lot of people 
convinced that they have their own responsibil-
ity, and this is very efficient. It’s a weakness, be-
cause if you’re under competitive pressure, or if 
there is a major technology that breaks through, 
the tendency of people is to optimize the space 
they’re in, and not to try to go into another space” 
(Czarniawska, 1985, p. 20).
In other words, the delegation of responsibility pro-
duced risk-avoiding behavior, just as the fear of pun-
ishment did for the Polish GMs.
Half of the corporations I studied had a planning 
process that differed from that of the Autonomy cor-
porations, and I labelled these type of process Con-
trol. In these corporations, the CEOs received broad 
corporate  guidelines  concerning  strategic  plans; 
a list of financial and qualitative objectives; and lists 
of restrictions, resources, critical areas, and general 
scenarios – the possible future condition of the econ-
omy, for instance. Equipped with these lists, the divi-
sion initiated a bottom-up planning process. This was 
followed by a negotiation process, induced primarily 
by negative reactions from CHQs over what was per-Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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ceived to be an inadequate contribution. “But, like in 
an auction”, one CEO told me, “you never start with 
the best offer” (Czarniawska, 1985, p. 20). The next 
step was to complete a plan format, with sometimes 
as many as 15 “key objectives” and 30 “supporting 
objectives”; they tended to be numerical and highly 
detailed, all recorded in a relatively formalized way. 
However, emergency interventions occurred during 
the year, and changes were introduced to the plans. 
If the necessity for change arose at the division level, 
there would be more negotiations than if it arose at 
the CHQ level.
The  CEOs  were  by  and  large  pleased  with  this 
planning process, emphasizing its clarity: “It’s a very 
clear process, and there’s no doubt in my mind dur-
ing the year. I know what I am going to accomplish” 
(Czarniawska, 1985, p. 21).
Comparisons between the two types of corporations 
revealed that Autonomy corporations shared two main 
characteristics: size (large) and a rapidly changing en-
vironment  (continuing  changes  in  technology,  and 
therefore in products, and strong and dynamic compe-
tition). These characteristics may have produced what 
can be called “a forced delegation”. No one at the top 
wished to take responsibility because it was impossible 
to control all the variables.
The corporations grouped under label of Control 
could be large, but if they were, they were more con-
cerned with stability than growth, and were operating 
in relatively stable markets. Other corporations oper-
ated in a rapidly changing environment, but because 
they were small, it was relatively easy for CHQ to con-
trol the fulfillment of their plans.
Comparisons between Polish and US planning pro-
cesses revealed some expected differences but also some 
less expected similarities. Central planning in US cor-
porations was always more “participatory”, but it must 
be stressed that this participation was limited to the 
highest levels: no “bottom-up” process started at the ac-
tual operation levels (this issue was confirmed by a great 
many complaints issued by Volvo executives when the 
company belonged to Ford; (Bragd, 2002)). Addition-
ally, the Polish procedures, as introduced by the 1975 re-
form, aimed at imitating the management pattern of US 
companies. The reform did not work, mostly because it 
did not conform to the prevailing political climate and 
because of constant political interventions. 
My US interlocutors did not mention any political 
interventions, local or federal. There could be various 
reasons for this: either there were no political inter-
ventions (after all, these companies were hardly arms 
producers), or the persons interviewed did not wish 
to inform a researcher from a socialist country about 
them. Perhaps in the USA, as in Poland, the decisive 
influence of politics was to be found, not in the small 
intrigues of local party committees, but in the general 
political  system  that  gave  legitimacy  certain  proce-
dures and routine actions.
In all cases, however, similar phenomena could be 
observed: the understating of capacities and the over-
stating of achievements, and, in the case of delegated 
responsibility,  risk  avoidance.  General  conclusions 
concerning central planning can be formulated as fol-
lows: as long as planning permits participation and 
negotiation, as well as a change of plans in emergency 
situations,  the  process  contributes  to  the  feeling  of 
clarity and well-directed activity.
Thirty years later
One could complain that descriptions of central plan-
ning in Poland are only of historical value. Surely, ev-
erything has changed after 1989? Although political 
regimes can change overnight, and legal frameworks 
follow suit, the immediate past is well entrenched in 
routines, rituals, and what Connerton (1989) termed 
bodily practices, all of which constitute social memo-
ry (or what can be called social recall; Czarniawska, 
2002). Additionally, as George Soros noted recently 
and  with  no  small  degree  of  disappointment,  “the 
collapse of a closed society does not automatically 
lead to an open one; the collapse may be seemingly 
bottomless, to be followed by the emergence of a new 
regime that has a greater resemblance to the regime 
that has collapsed than to an open society” (Soros, 
2011, p. 14). Moreover, old habits are not necessarily 
punished in new circumstances. It is said, only half in 
jest, that the Poles are highly successful in obtaining 
funds from the EU because they have a long-prac-
ticed skill of describing things that never happened, 
both as plans and as reports.
There are many similarities between central plan-
ning in a planned economy and in large corporations. 
Strategic planning is central planning; the difference 
lies primarily in size. As Whittington (1993) noted, 40 Barbara Czarniawska
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strategic planning also plays a clearly political role: re-
producing the conditions of hierarchically organized 
capitalist society, normalizing the existing structures 
of western societies, and universalizing the goals of 
the dominant elites. Strategy-formation patterns are 
difficult to change, as they are “founded on real eco-
nomic, social or political conditions” (p. 32). Thus it 
is appropriate to follow the unusual path indicated by 
de Certeau (1988), who suggested that whereas strat-
egy expresses what bosses want, it is through tactics 
that subordinates find ways to circumvent or straight-
forwardly  resist  it  (de  La  Ville  &  Mounoud,  2003). 
“Strategies (…) conceal beneath objective calculations 
their connection with the power that sustains them 
from within the stronghold of its own ‘proper’ place 
of institution” (de Certeau, 1988, p. 20). Thus whereas 
strategists produce plans and budgets, those who are 
to implement them translate and transform them for 
their use, creatively mixing routines and improvisa-
tion. “…[A] tactic depends on time – it is always on 
the watch for opportunities that must be seized ‘on the 
wing.’ Whatever it wins, it does not keep. It must con-
stantly manipulate events in order to turn them into 
‘opportunities’” (de Certeau, 1988, p. 19). This quote 
captures the practices of the Polish GMs, whereas the 
US CEOs, especially those grouped under the Auton-
omy label, can be seen as strategists, with tactics being 
shifted further down the hierarchy. 
Thus  planning  is  always  related  to  politics  –  on 
several levels – and its connection to performance is 
always complex. Not surprisingly, this observation is 
corroborated most strongly in public sector organiza-
tions, which I now intend to exemplify using urban 
planning. 
Urban planning: Is chaos beautiful?
Can the analogy between economic planning and ur-
ban planning hold? I would claim that the two of the 
traits of planning listed above are transferable: urban 
planning is always related to politics, and its connec-
tion to performance is always complex. However, the 
position of urban planners cannot be compared to the 
positions of HO-Ts or CHQs: they are more similar 
to the Polish GMs, exposed to sometimes conflicting 
expectations  from  HO-Ts  (mostly  professional)  and 
local authorities. The real difference, however, is the 
heterogeneity of contractors that implement the plans. 
Although 49 is a substantial number of enterprises or 
divisions, the enterprises are similar, as are the divi-
sions; they have the same owner and share most of 
their administrative routines. The political and eco-
nomic expectations faced by urban planners may be 
fairly coherent, but a large number of units, which are, 
in turn, subject to a variety of strategies and tactics, 
must then interpret the plans. Nevertheless, political 
and economic expectations being translated into plans 
represent a powerful “calculus of force-relationship” 
(de Certeau, 1988, p. 19), and the process of urban 
planning can be examined by comparing and contrast-
ing it to economic planning.
I now consider two extreme examples: what I call 
total planning and a plan-less city.
Total planning
The usual examples of total urban planning are taken 
from post-World-War-II Europe, especially the parts 
of Europe such as Warsaw that became forced allies of 
the USSR. However the idea of total urban planning 
can be said to be as old (or as new) as modernity itself, 
and the model examples are Petersburg, Haussmanian 
Paris, and the French colonies.
In 1703, Peter the Great conquered a city belong-
ing to the Swedes, located where the Neva flows into 
the Baltic Sea. He gave it his own name and decided to 
make it his “window on Europe”. It became the Russian 
capital in 1712, and the best specialists of Italian ba-
roque were employed to give it a modern and western 
look. Drafted by Peter in two weeks, as the story goes, 
it was planned from the beginning to be an imposing 
capital; a regular street pattern was interspersed with 
impressive squares and broad avenues radiating from 
the Admiralty Shipyard, one of the Peter’s first invest-
ments. At the end of the century, Petersburg counted 
220,200  inhabitants,  more  than  one-third  of  whom 
were employed by the administration or the military. 
It was not until the 19th century that the results of 
Peter’s urban design could be truly appreciated. Much 
against the will of his subordinates, he created a truly 
modern city, much like the one described by Thern-
ström and Sennett (1969). 
For the writer Gogol, there was no greater contrast 
between cities than that between the Northern City of 
Petersburg and the Southern City of Rome (Fanger, 
1965). Petersburg represented an “unnatural” creation Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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(against nature,  both in the sense of the inhospitable 
temperature and violent waters), crowded buildings, 
and commercialism. Rome, however, represents beau-
ty of form and movement, proportions, and harmony.
Ugliness,  kinlessness,  and  alienation  are  typical 
characteristics  of  the  modern  Northern  City.  This 
theme was adopted again, even more powerfully, by the 
psychologist and sociologist of fiction, Dostoyevsky. In 
his eyes, Petersburg was “the most abstract and inten-
tional city in the world” (Fanger, 1965, p. 105), which 
produced  the  “quintessential  urban  life”  with  forms 
“liable to be sordid” (p. 192). It was a city “crowded, 
stifling, and parched” (p. 194), a city of unrelieved pov-
erty, where the magnificence of the scene served only 
to emphasize human misery. Raskolnikov, in Crime 
and Punishment, looks habitually at the majestic pan-
orama along the river and thinks about its coldness; all 
it suggests to him is some kind of a dead spirit.  The 
real city, the live city, is the city of the sidewalk (the 
eulogy of which is to be found again in the writings of 
Jane Jacobs, 1961), but this is also the city of disease, 
isolation, and fear. As Donald Fanger put it:
… the city is accidental – not in its founding, but 
in the “abstract” results of that intentional found-
ing. Petersburg becomes “the most fantastic city, 
with the most fantastic history of all the cities of 
the earth” in terms of the abnormality of the life 
that is lived there. The absence of roots, frequent 
changes of apartments, precariousness of employ-
ment – these are further signs. And so, of course, 
is the absence of nature … Even the climate is 
inimical  to  normal  life,  producing  those  ‘pale, 
green, sickly faces’ that Raskolnikov professes to 
love and provoking a kind of reciprocal action 
in coloring the Petersburgers’ own perception of 
their city … (Fanger, 1965, p. 203).
This was the modern city inherited by the next century 
and the next generation of modernists; they saw its im-
provement as their central task.
When England passed the Town Planning Act in 
1909, the French social reformers, and especially the 
liberal socialists who gathered around Musée Social, 
felt left behind (Rabinow, 1989). Indeed, the first such 
laws were not passed in France until 1919 and even 
then without enforcing sanctions. It was thus in the 
colonies  of  Madagascar  and  Morocco  that  French 
modernization ideas could be put to work. Paul Rabi-
now dedicated a thoroughly researched volume to that 
process– mainly as it was conducted in Morocco by 
Resident-General Hubert Lyautey with the aid of ar-
chitect Henri Prost between 1912 and 1925. 
Petersburg was constructed and regulated through 
its  streets  and  buildings,  but  the  French  reformers 
aimed at the social fabric. They built twin cities – mod-
ern  European  cities  next  to  the  Moroccan  medinas 
– enriching the cities with the elements of local orna-
ment and modernizing the medinas (both within well-
constrained limits of racial paternalism). Social plan-
ning was employed at an unprecedented scale; thanks 
to a vigorous disappropriation, a modern city could be 
created and pay tribute to the traditional culture.
When  urban  reformism  “returned”  to  France,  it 
was soon forced to discard its organic and culturalist 
elements. Rabinow selected Henri Sellier, a leading ur-
banist and Mayor of the Paris suburb of Suresnes, as 
an example of a transitional figure. Fond of the older 
socialist  symbols  of  history  and  locale,  Sellier  was 
prompted by his younger assistants to abandon these 
symbols in the name of efficiency, science, progress, 
and welfare. One of his assistants suggested a change 
from a plan de ville to a plan de vie – an excellent exam-
ple, Rabinow (1989) said, of the modernist totalization. 
The city could be completely manufactured: its streets, 
its buildings, its social relations, and its citizens.
Similar ambitions were shared by the city planners 
of Warsaw twice in recent history: first from 1945 on-
ward, one of the more important years of which was 
1950, the year of “municipalization” and the subse-
quent nationalization of the city; and next from 1990 
to 1995 (Czarniawska, 2000). Both periods were as-
sociated with “the construction of a new Warsaw”. In 
both  periods,  two  planning  processes  were  central: 
urban planning and development and administrative 
and legal developments. Both processes had a close 
but complicated interaction and were subordinated to 
politics with a capital P. The economic and technical 
problems were, in turn, subordinated to urban plan-
ning and legal changes. 
After  1945,  the  authorities  maintained  the  status 
quo of the public sector for a period, and jurisdiction 
was divided between “governmental” and “self-govern-
mental” spheres. In Sweden, the term “local democra-
cy” is used instead of “self-government”; England uses 
the term “local government” for the same purpose. 42 Barbara Czarniawska
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These two terms reflect the assumption that both local 
and central government are “self-governments” – in 
other words, democratic. Accordingly, the differences 
lie in the locus of power, not in its character.  The Pol-
ish terminology alludes to the fact that the central gov-
ernment may be, and historically has typically been, of 
a non-democratic nature. 
State control was introduced in 1950, and all public 
property was turned over to the state treasury. In the 
case of Warsaw, this was peculiar property, as 85 per 
cent of the value of the city’s real estate had been demol-
ished (Wyganowski, 1993, p. 11). Of the 957 historical 
buildings in Warsaw, 782 had been totally destroyed, 
141 partially destroyed, and only 34 untouched (Cul-
len, 1994, p. 36). The territory of Warsaw was treated as 
an area open to all types of urbanistic projects (in one 
particularly critical opinion, “the city planners got abso-
lute power”, quoted in Czarniawska, 2000, p. 19), and to 
this end a special decree allocated private grounds and 
buildings first to the city, and later to the state.
Residents of Warsaw expressed a variety of emotions 
about some of the urbanist projects in their city, includ-
ing the (in)famous Culture Palace, previously the sym-
bol of hated Soviet oppression and then rehabilitated 
as a historical monument, a document of its historical 
period. It is most likely Warsaw wit that spawned the 
story of the Soviet Union offering a choice between the 
palace and a metro; the authorities at that time, ever 
eager to please Big Brother, chose the palace. Sophisti-
cated people turned up their noses at the reconstruc-
tion of a fake Old Town, but it was a project that ap-
pealed to the emotions of both the resident population 
and tourists. The reconstruction of the Royal Castle in 
1974 did not evoke as many positive emotions as did 
the Old Town. Some reevaluations have also occurred 
over time. The much-derided MDM (Marszalkowska 
Street  residential  district)  and  other  monuments  of 
the Stalinist era turned out to be “not so bad”, whereas 
the miracle of modernity from the 1970s, the Ursynow 
district, was predicted, with some exaggeration, to be-
come a slum. 
In a word, every urbanistic project in Warsaw creat-
ed a wave of emotions, sometimes positive, sometimes 
negative; but over time and as contacts with foreign 
countries intensified, they were increasingly negative.
After the pivotal year of 1989, the first central gov-
ernment (that of Tadeusz Mazowiecki) and the two 
that followed focused a great deal of attention on a bill 
for the reprivatization of land in Warsaw. The idea of 
self-government was also obvious but the form that it 
would take was highly problematic. Warsaw was ex-
cluded from the Polish Local Government Act to re-
solve the problem of reprivatization. The special treat-
ment  of  Warsaw  in  1945  compelled  equally  special 
treatment in 1990. The act provided for a uniform con-
ception of the municipality as a sovereign administra-
tive entity, irrespective its size or location. In Warsaw, 
a Union of District Municipalities consisting of seven 
district municipalities (later to include the Municipal-
ity of Ursus) was created on the assumption that local 
problems, including reprivatization, would be easier to 
solve locally, whereas the union should be responsible 
for “general tasks”, which were not specified in the act 
– most likely under the expectation that they would be 
settled through experience and negotiations. The ques-
tion of the municipal economy did not seem to be dif-
ficult at first, but later a discussion began over the ser-
vices it should include, and which services were better 
left to district management or purchased from private 
companies. In practice, the municipal economy came 
to comprise waterworks and the sewage system, public 
transportation, garbage collection, and district heating 
and gas, although the utility that produces them serves 
not merely the city, but the whole county. A few years 
later, the city government took over responsibility for 
the state of Warsaw’s streets from the county governor. 
Some district municipalities took over certain spheres 
of activity, such as schools.
Martial  law  witnessed  the  appearance  of  citizen 
committees – groups of individuals who attempted to 
maintain order locally amid the growing confusion. 
Almost automatically, the same people became coun-
cilors and mayors after the self-government election of 
27 May 1990. They “took over the old structure with 
a task to continue” (Czarniawska, 2000, p. 20), and the 
general feeling was that a new structure and new man-
agement rules had to be developed. This necessity be-
came increasingly clear while the new administration 
gained  experience  and  new  problems  accumulated. 
Slowly but surely, a politicization of the municipal cad-
re began. Regardless of the councilors’ political stripes, 
planning was not an activity to be cherished. Warsaw 
was again to become a “modern city”, but along the 
lines sketched from 1919 to 1939, not due to any total Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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planning. Moreover, it seemed obvious that such key 
matters as infrastructure should be centrally planned 
and managed (Czarniawska, 2002).
It may appear, therefore, that the idea of “total city 
planning” belongs to the history of modernity, which 
itself  is  becoming  ancient.  Postmodernity,  as  it  is 
known, returned to pre-modern values, especially in 
architecture.  It  is  therefore  appropriate  to  examine 
Gogol’s ideal city of the South: Rome.
A plan-less city
During  my  study  of  city  management  in  Rome 
(Czarniawska, 2002), my interlocutors confided in me – 
with what I read as a mixture of shame and pride – that 
the city did not have a traffic system. There was no urban 
transport plan, and neither the tariffs nor the networks 
were integrated.  As one interviewee told me:
[To understand it], you have to go back centu-
ries, to the creation of Municipalities and Do-
minions, that is 1300-1500, when the empires 
disintegrated. From then on the local particular-
ism was of the utmost importance, the so-called 
villageism, which drags on until today. In the city, 
and even in the region, there are clearly areas 
that  are  economically  and  culturally  homoge-
neous and that could be more rationally planned 
and managed. This is, alas, excluded by admin-
istrative divisions. The regional authorities were 
supposed to take care of these problems, but they 
did not (Czarniawska, 2002, p. 28).
The  problem  was  not  only  spatial;  attempts  at  city 
planning in Rome reveal a temporal aspect that was 
not present in previous examples in which the political 
regime remained stable – at least during a typical plan-
ning period. Recently, I studied the generally abortive 
plans of urban renewal directed at the Roman district 
of Magliana, which extends along the Tiber between 
Fiumicino Airport and the center, thus representing 
a potentially attractive part of the city. At present, how-
ever, it is a mixture of industrial landscapes, dilapidat-
ed plots of unknown ownership, haphazard camping 
places, and various sport activities.
I began my story with a excerpt from Municipal 
Council Resolution no. 9 from 8 January 2001, which 
contained a decision to undertake 11 urban recovery 
projects  –  among  them  “Magliana”  (Czarniawska, 
2010, pp. 422-423):
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
DECIDES:
•		 to adopt a definite Urban Recovery Program 
related to the location “Magliana”(...); 
•		 to publish this Program, including various 
urbanistic  solutions,  and  to  collect  com-
ments concerning the possible consequenc-
es of such solutions, as stipulated by art. 49, 
2 of the L.R.L. n. 38/1999; 
•		 to begin formulating and completing the nec-
essary agreements between the Municipality 
and the Lazio Region, in terms of art. 3 of the 
protocol  of  understanding  reached  by  this 
Council on 17 March 2000, the aim of which 
the definitive approval and financing of the 
Urban Recovery Programs, and to provide the 
Mayor with a mandate to conduct the agree-
ments described above, in the terms of art. 24, 
4 of the Statute of the Municipality of Rome; 
•		 to assent to the private intervention projects 
related  to  the  Urban  Recovery  Program,  as 
represented in the relative urbanistic projects 
and technical-economic charts appended in 
B, which constitute an integral and substan-
tive part of the present resolution; (…)
•		 to adopt a contractual arrangement between 
the Municipality of Rome and the private en-
tities offering projects, which is appended as 
C and constitutes an integral and substantive 
part of the present resolution; 
•		 to insert the public works planned within 
the Urban Recovery Program into the bian-
nual and triennial budgets for public works, 
including them in annual and triennial re-
ports as direct costs for the same municipal 
administration,  as  decided  by  Financial 
Plans for Urban Recovery Programs; (…)
•		 to give the Municipal Government the author-
ity to control the quality of the public works at 
the point of approving their plans. (...)
The following was attached to the Resolution: a “Tab. 
5. The financial plan of interventions”, containing item 
“OP13. Expropriation transfer and realization of the 
park ‘Pian Due Torri’. Total sum: € 9,296,224.18”.
The Resolution and the plan were presented to 
the Lazio Region for approval and financing. The 44 Barbara Czarniawska
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Region  demanded  more  specific  plans  and  proj-
ects,  and  for  this  purpose,  two  special  organiza-
tional units were created in 2006: VI, which was 
dedicated to projects, and VII, which was dedicated 
to  the  management  of  projects.  What  transpired 
from 2001 to 2005 is difficult to ascertain (a simi-
lar uncertainty concerned the years 1993-2001; in 
accessible documents, these periods are covered by the 
label “gestation of the program”), but toward the end 
of 2007, there were positive developments. The fol-
lowing is a message from the Department of Urban 
Planning from 28 February 2007:
(…) The program concerns the area stretching 
between  the  Tiber  and  the  tracks  of  the  local 
train that connects Orte to Fiumicino Airport. 
Magliana, one of the most densely populated dis-
tricts of Rome, suffers from being isolated from 
the rest of the city, to which it is connected only 
by the crowded bridge in the direction of EUR, 
by Isaac Newton Street and by passages under 
the train tracks that are totally inadequate for 
the present level of traffic.  The old suburbs are 
surrounded by the residential area constructed 
in the 1960s, and are interspersed with various 
shanties originally constructed for some industri-
al or commercial purposes, but now abandoned, 
and by open spaces lacking any function. The 
interventions  planned  within  the  program  are 
distributed along two axes: the green axis, be-
ginning at Villa Bonelli Park, crossing Pescaglia 
and Cutigliano streets, arriving at the gardens 
at Castiglion Fibocchi Street and from there to 
the new Tiber River park; and the axis of services 
and new functions, which will connect the dis-
trict of Roma Tre University with San Paolo with 
a new pedestrian bridge, and will cross the dis-
trict passing by the public market at Lari Street, 
terminating in the area of Greve Street, where it 
will  concentrate  various  commercial,  cultural, 
and touristic activities. The system of internal 
viability and the connections with the city will 
be realized by using and developing the potential 
of the existing system of train lines, but will also 
involve restructuring and completing important 
traffic nodes between Isaac Newton Street, Ma-
gliana Bridge, Motorway Rome Fiumicino, and 
the streets of Magliana and Magliana Nuova.  In 
total, the planned interventions – 22 public and 
10 private – will affect an area of 170 hectares, 
inhabited by 30 000 persons, and require an in-
vestment of €155 million. The projected time for 
the adoption  of the Program and the stipulation 
of the related Agreement on the Program and the 
realization of the public works is a minimum of 
12 months and a maximum of 60 months de-
pending on the complexity of the works included. 
(Czarniawska, 2010, pp. 423-424)
Part  of  this  program  was  the  Pian  Due  Torri  Park, 
called Tiber River Park in this document. By January 
2008, one of the two main Italian dailies, La Repub-
blica, confirmed the changes to the fate of Magliana:
“Magliana, a park on the river”
A green area of 8 hectares will uncoil along the 
loop of the Tiber from the Magliana Bridge to the 
Industry Bridge, i.e., on the terrain previously 
occupied by illicit campers. The project also in-
cludes the creation of a true green lung for the 
city: the park “Pian Due Torri”. A public work 
costing €9 million, financed by the Lazio Region, 
will improve the quality of life of the inhabitants 
(…). At present, car-body shops, various depos-
its,  and  other  commercial  enterprises  occupy 
the area where, by the end of the year, the works 
necessary to make a park will begin. A total of 
43 companies will be moved to other places (…). 
As to other projects along the loop of the river, 
these will be discussed with the inhabitants. The 
present plans include a bicycle and walking track, 
an area for dogs, a health track with appropriate 
equipment, new illumination to make the area 
more secure, a playground for children, a picnic 
area with tables and benches, a football arena, 
and a landing for boats that sail the Tiber. The 
works and the security arrangements will be open 
to a public tender directed to the cooperatives 
that wish to undertake the job. (Czarniawska, 
2010, pp. 424)
How were those decisions and plans translated into ac-
tions? Partly, I could see such actions myself, running 
daily on the health track; partly, they have been com-
mented upon and reported by the inhabitants and their 
associations. The sum of money dedicated to the project 
has not changed in seven years; one can imagine that Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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the prices did, however. Next, 43 companies were to be 
moved to other places. But which companies? The area 
was infamous for a large number of illicit enterprises 
that had been discovered and closed down – an illicit 
kennel, for example – but there were many shanties the 
purposes of which have been forgotten and many dilapi-
dated properties with unclear ownership. 
It was clear what would remain. There were al-
ready two sports arenas; one belonged to the near-
by parish and the other, which was likely to be up-
graded, belonged to the municipality. There were 
also two paddocks and a horse track. These objects 
already existed; they needed only to be translated 
into the new park. What was happening and what 
was changing? 
Citizens belonging to the Association for Educa-
tional Education started an action: “Let’s clean our 
park”. Baskets were located along the Tiber, and 
the inhabitants were encouraged to wear rubber 
gloves and join in the cleaning action, which began 
on 14 July and was to continue for “some days” be-
tween 7.00 and 8.00 in the morning. No connection 
to planned municipal actions could be discerned.
The municipality undertook some actions, how-
ever. By 2007, small metal fences were placed on the 
walking track, making it impossible to enter the em-
bankment, and thereby stopping the Romany people 
who camped there with their caravans. Yet it is un-
certain if the new city administration performed this 
action under the heading of their flagship program, 
“Safety in the City” (aimed at eliminating Romany 
encampments within the city centre) or as part of 
the Magliana Urban Recovery Program.
Suddenly, solar panels arose in the middle of the 
route. The initial speculation was that the struc-
tures were to be the starting point of a funicular 
that would cross the river, toward Roma Tre Uni-
versity. The character of the construction, although 
not  its  purpose,  soon  became  clear.  Perhaps  the 
panels were to provide energy for the lamps along 
the health track? At present, the area under the 
panels is used for parking, and the reeds have over-
grown the panels.
One day in January 2008, a crew in municipal 
uniforms arrived at the end of the health track and 
began to mark the places where the fence prevent-
ing the reeds from overgrowing the track should 
be placed, continuing the existing fence. Nothing 
transpired  throughout  February  and  March,  but 
one Monday in April they returned, and installed 
five meters of fencing. Their work was observed 
with great interest by the Romany children, who 
were  still  living  there.  By  September  2008,  the 
remaining markings were already vanishing. The 
benches and new garbage cans are in place to this 
day, somewhat worse for wear.
Opposite  the  embankment  is  the  residential 
side, which also formed part of the Urban Recovery 
Project. Some of the buildings (there are apartment 
buildings, two schools and one home for the el-
derly) are extremely attractive, and would become 
even more attractive if the park project were real-
ized. A construction entrepreneur undertook the 
renovation of one house, previously burnt (reeds 
along  the  river  often  catch  fire),  but  apparently 
ran out of money. The renovation came to a halt, it 
seems, in the middle of a working day. Until May 
2008,  the  external  elevator  remained  halfway 
down; some windows have glass in them, and oth-
ers do not. The building was finished by 2010, and 
a municipal administrative office moved in. 
Squatters  occupy  yet  another  building,  stand-
ing between two posh buildings. Previously, some 
of them were Romany families; at present, judging 
from the Trotskyist and Maoist flags on the balco-
nies, the inhabitants constitute a different group.
Within the framework of the URP Magliana, the 
municipality built a playground for children in the 
middle of the residential street – a peculiar play-
ground. A parking lot is located on one side; cars 
park  there  during  the  week,  and  teenagers  rule 
during  the  weekend.  The  playground  is  covered 
with asphalt. Perhaps asphalt is needed for some 
types of games, but still, it breaks one’s heart to see 
that just on the other side of the playground, near 
the river, there is a lush, almost tropical, private 
area with palms and the like. Furthermore, there is 
no space between the track and the parking lot on 
one side, and the track and the playground fence 
on the other, so cyclists and walkers who happen to 
arrive at the same time create a traffic jam.
There  is  also  the  question  of  whose  track  it  is. 
There is a path running along the river on the em-
bankment; now that the Romany people are gone, 46 Barbara Czarniawska
10.5709/ce.1897-9254.66 DOI:  CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS
Vol. 6 Issue4 36-48 2012
increasing numbers of dog owners go there. Not all of 
them, however. Many remain on the health track, and 
not many of them carry plastic bags. This is the end of 
the track, or rather the end of the park project, as the 
track continues on the other side of the river.
My account of the project is tinted by my Swedish 
perspective on such things as city planning. I imagine 
(most likely wrongly) that, at home in Gothenburg, 
I would know exactly what is and is not being done, 
and I would be able to follow the realization of the 
project from beginning to end. If something did not go 
according to plan, my local newspaper would explain 
it to me the next day or at least two days later. I often 
had to correct the locals in Magliana, however, who 
claimed that “nothing was being done”. Some things 
were being done, but the choice of projects, their lo-
cations, their timing, and why they were incomplete 
was not clear. The pedestrian bridge had been built; 
although, according to the sceptical locals, it did not 
lead from the Basilica of San Paolo to the Roma Tre 
University, but “from nowhere to nowhere” (here the 
locals are correct). It was also difficult to see any con-
nections between the projects. 
In 2008, the opposition won the national elec-
tions and the local elections in Rome. Taking office 
in June 2008, Mayor Gianni Alemanno and his al-
lies announced that there was an “enormous hole” 
in the city’s finances. “Bluff and mystification”, was 
the  reply  of  the  opposition  (Corriere  della  Sera, 
2008-06-16 in Czarniawska, 2010, p. 434). A thor-
ough investigation was promised. On 29 September 
2008, Alemanno presented the results, supported 
by his Treasurer:
“Plan of retreat, hour of truth”.
(…) “Today is the day of truth and responsibility 
I hope, and not of the useless and irresponsible 
debates”. Thus the Mayor begins his speech to the 
City Council. The report confirms that the total 
debt of the Municipality amounts to €8,646 bil-
lion. (…) (Messagero Cronaca di Roma, 2008-
09-30 in Czarniawska, 2010, p. 434).
What about Urban Recovery Projects? The mayor pro-
posed to the Council a list of severe cuts:
 (…) These are only some of the cuts the Ale-
manno administration proposed to the Council 
in conjunction with the report on finances pre-
pared by Treasurer Ezio Catiglione in a proposal 
that  yesterday  began  to  work  its  way  through 
the Council. A cut of 677 million, 358 from cur-
rent expenses and 319 from investments, among 
which was a series of projects (for a total of 54 
million)  planned  by  the  Center-Left  that  were 
abandoned by the Center-Right. In recompense, 
€800 million for the equipment of city police (…), 
200 million for the Marzano Committee [for the 
Future of the City of Rome]; and even 740 000 for 
the office of the Mayor: “A real scandal, says an 
angry [member of the opposition], people die of 
hunger and these people use one and half billion 
old lire to buy Christmas presents and give osten-
tatious dinners” (La Repubblica, 2008-09-19, in 
Czarniawska, 2010, p. 434).
What  of  the  URP  Magliana?  The  Resolution  of  the 
Council (nr 66 of 12/13 December 2008, containing the 
Financial  Plan  for  2009-2001,  113  pages)  mentioned 
neither Magliana nor Pian Due Torri, but the introduc-
tion to the financial plan, item 4.14, “Policy for public 
works, urban maintenance and peripheries”, stated:
Rome is a city that grew urbanistically with no 
rules or against the existing ones. One can ob-
serve, on the one hand, a continuous increase of 
so-called “spontaneous” construction, and on the 
other, grand investments in residential areas be-
yond any effective planning, accompanied by an 
excessive proliferation of mega-shopping centers. 
All this lowered the urban quality and above all 
reversed the “normal” order of things: the neces-
sary infrastructure follows large residential proj-
ects, not the other way around. Additionally, we 
have to report a total collapse of the realization 
of urban recovery projects in zones “O” (…), and 
many “empty places” –centers of illicit activity for 
which no recovery plans have ever been formu-
lated.  In  this  situation,  absolute  priority  must 
be given to the realization of urban plans; and 
the actions of City Administration will be based 
upon the following grand pillars:
1.  Safety margins of urban re-qualification (…)
2.  Architectural infrastructure (…)
3.  Urban restructuration (…)
4.  Urban maintenance (…) 
(Czarniawska, 2010, p. 434)
Pian Due Torri program may or may not be classified 
under the first “pillar”. On the one hand, the money Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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was provided by the region and cannot be used for 
another purpose. On the other hand, was any of that 
money left? On p. 96, however, a resolution, under 
item 4.12 “Urbanistic policies and territorial plan-
ning”, stated that efforts will be made to complete the 
agreements reached within the existing urban recov-
ery programs. The Italian proverb, Chi vivrà, vedrà 
(Who will live, will see) is much more dramatic than 
the usual English rendering: “Wait and see”.
From the perspective of an organization theoreti-
cian, the gap between plans and declarations and their 
visible results may be larger than the hole in the City 
of Rome’s budget. Chaos seems to prevail, and rather 
than the ancient form of villageism, it seems to depend 
on tricks played by and with time. On the one hand, 
the time between plans and their alleged realization 
is so long that even the best plans become obsolete. 
On the other hand, plans are rendered unstable by the 
swift pace of political change (until Berlusconi’s time, 
governments  in  Italy  fell  more  quickly  than  leaves 
from the trees).
Urban planning and politics: 
A loosely coupled system?
As the reader can guess by now, I am approaching 
a typical set of researcher’s conclusions: on the one 
hand and on the other hand... Yes, planning is always 
entangled with politics, for better or for worse. Yes, 
nothing goes as planned. Yes, the implementers devise 
a whole array of tactics to convert the plans to their 
own liking or at least to minimize harm to themselves. 
On the other hand, planning is a powerful tranquil-
izer (“we know what we are going to do”), and an un-
planned city is as much a disaster as a totally planned 
city – or even more so. 
Allow me to put it this way: planning is unavoidable 
and so are some of its disadvantages. People will protect 
themselves from losses and punishments by devising 
tactics to defeat strategies and reverse plans. This may 
not be bad, as the forcefulness of total planning has 
heavy costs, and sometimes procrastination saves cit-
ies and companies from overly hasty innovations. The 
way to minimize the possible problems of these tactics 
is to make the planning process more participatory (for 
the well-known example of Malmö, see e.g. Listerborn, 
2007). Again, some observers note that such partici-
patory urban planning follows the pattern observed in 
participatory software design, in which participation is 
often an occasion for the designers to teach the users 
what they can reasonably expect (Czarniawska, 2009). 
However, this is better than plans that will only evoke 
resistance  or  subversion.  Yet  whereas  most  experi-
ments with “communicative planning” and its varia-
tions (see e.g. Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002) 
focus on communication between planners and citi-
zens, the lesson to be drawn from organization stud-
ies is that the contractors should be admitted to the 
planning process, difficult as that can be from a legal 
perspective.
These various examples of planning suggest an-
other  valuable  lesson:  when  reality  changes,  plans 
must also change. They did not change in the so-
cialist regimes as a matter of principle; but even in 
market economies, a change of plans in public en-
terprises (actually, regardless of if the owner is the 
state,  the  municipality,  or  private  shareholders)  is 
treated with suspicion and requires a great deal of 
explaining. Yet unchanged plans can become, as in 
Weick’s story of the firefighters (1996), heavy tools 
that weigh their carriers down, making escape from 
the fire impossible. 
Regarding the connection between urban planning 
and politics, another of Weick’s (1979) suggestions ap-
plies: loosely-coupled systems, well known in architec-
ture in earthquake-threatened areas, are more likely to 
survive even political earthquakes. 
However, one thing is certain: despite the ideo-
logical  arguments  to  the  contrary,  there  are  many 
similarities between planning and managing across 
public and private sector organizations, ideological 
divides, and times and places. This is due to a com-
monly shared and deeply integrated conviction that 
planning and management are basically neutral. After 
all, Lenin allegedly said that the new Soviet economy 
must  even  learn  from  the  devil,  meaning  Fredrick 
Taylor (Wren & Bedeian, 2004). In the private sec-
tor, any connection to politics tends to be treated as 
a deviation, aberration, or even a crime. Perhaps it is 
time to take it for granted that while of management 
models  are  sometimes  transferred  from  the  public 
to the private sector and sometimes in the opposite 
direction, one thing remains unchanged: planning’s 
connection  to  politics.  Having  admitted  this,  they 
must be kept loosely coupled.48 Barbara Czarniawska
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